Ukraine Can’t Destroy Russia’s Air Force on the Ground

It would be dangerously wrong to think Ukrainian success in airfield attacks is the solution to Russian air dominance. Because it isn’t.

In June 1941, during Operation Barbarossa — the massive German invasion of Russia — more than 3,500 Soviet aircraft were destroyed in the first week. Many of those planes were hit on the ground by relentless Luftwaffe strikes on airbases.

Can Ukraine do the same to Russia today?

Despite being outnumbered and outgunned in the air war, Ukraine may have found a way to help neutralize Russian airpower. In June, Ukrainian drones damaged one, or possibly two, Su-57s — Russia’s advanced stealth fighter — during an attack on an airfield in southern Russia.

This isn’t the first time that Russian aviation has had its wings clipped. Attacks on airfields, using drones, rockets, and even saboteurs have destroyed or damaged dozens of aircraft and helicopters. But these strikes tended to be aimed at airbases fairly close to the Ukrainian border.

This is why those shrapnel-pocked Su-57s should worry the Kremlin, and not just because a lot of expensive hardware was damaged. The attack happened at the Akhtubinsk airbase, about 370 miles from Ukraine, and about 100 miles east of Volgograd (the former Stalingrad.) If Ukrainian drones can penetrate that deep into Russia, and if the US gives permission for ATACMS ground-launched ballistic rockets to hit targets out to their full 190-mile range, then numerous Russian airfields are vulnerable. 

Where to base aircraft is always a dilemma. Operating from airfields close to the front maximizes aircraft payload and loiter time over the battlefield, but also leaves them more exposed to attack. Basing aircraft further to the rear reduces their vulnerability but also their combat effectiveness, and taxes scarce resources such as aerial tankers for mid-air refueling.

Ironically, Russian airpower is being threatened just as it is beginning to have a decisive impact on the war. Despite owning more and better planes than Ukraine — and confident pre-war Western predictions of Putin’s falcons swooping down on hapless Ukrainians — Russia’s air force has proven surprisingly ineffective. This year though, Russian pilots finally found their niche: dropping giant GPS-guided glide bombs.

These weapons aren’t as accurate as America’s JDAM, and they have a disconcerting habit of coming down on Russian cities. But they also make big craters that obliterate Ukrainian defenses, blasting a path that has enabled Russia’s army of convict cannon fodder to capture towns such as Avdiivka.

For Ukraine, glide bombs have been among the war’s most frustrating threats. Russian planes can drop them from as far as 40 miles behind the front lines, beyond the range of Ukrainian anti-aircraft missiles. Blasting those bomb trucks before they get into the air is an appealing prospect.

Yet crippling a large enemy air force on the ground — Russia has more than 1,000 fighters and bombers — is no easy matter. Despite being decimated in 1941, the Soviet Air Force managed to recover and went on to dominate Eastern Front skies by 1945.

The Israeli Air Force’s destruction of Arab airpower in the 1967 Six-Day War has gone down in history as a textbook example of a counter-air campaign against enemy airfields. But when the IAF tried the same strategy in the 1973 October War, it failed to destroy Arab planes protected by revetments, while Israeli aircraft suffered heavy losses from anti-aircraft defenses protecting those bases.

The most successful airfield denial campaigns are surprise attacks against unsuspecting foes who conveniently line up their planes on the runway. But that’s a sucker punch that usually works once, until the enemy adapts countermeasures, such as dispersal and camouflage.

Russia can’t stop all Ukrainian drone or rocket attacks against its airbases. But it can park aircraft in hardened shelters, or protect them with GPS jammers and air defense weapons. Indeed, Russia did this after US-made HIMARS rockets devastated Russian supply depots and command posts in 2022. Russia responded by moving critical facilities out of HIMARS range and tried with some success to jam the rockets’ GPS guidance systems.

This doesn’t mean that Ukraine should stop targeting Russian airfields. Forcing Russia to station its aircraft further to its rear diminishes its effectiveness. Diverting air defenses and electronic warfare systems from the front line to airbase defense helps the hard-pressed Ukrainian army. New technologies, such as jam-resistant GPS guidance and AI-controlled autonomous drones, may enable Ukrainian weapons to penetrate Russian defenses.

Nonetheless, while Ukraine can hurt and harass Russian airpower, it can’t cripple it on the ground. This suggests the old-fashioned way of destroying an enemy air force: shooting it down in air-to-air combat. In February 1944, the US sought air superiority in Western Europe by launching massive bomber raids against German aircraft factories. This forced German fighters into the air, where they could be destroyed by American fighters. The Luftwaffe lost a third of its fighters in a week.

The Ukrainian air force lacks the numerical and technological superiority that American airpower enjoyed in 1944. But it will soon be getting around 65 F-16 fighters from European donors. That’s too few to achieve air superiority. But in combination with drone and rocket attacks on airfields, Ukraine may be able to at least partly neutralize Russian strike aircraft.

All of which raises a disturbing possibility. If Western nations believe that Ukraine can eliminate Russian airpower on the ground, then there might be less urgency to provide the jet fighters that will actually make a difference. That would be a mistake. The air war will be won in the air, not on the ground.

Michael Peck is a defense commentator. He can be found on Twitter and LinkedIn.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.