Gaza, Ukraine and China: How Biden can still move the dial on foreign policy

Biden’s choice to leave the race and endorse Vice President Kamala Harris for the Democratic nomination throws the US presidential race into waters that have not been navigated since 1968, when Democratic president Lyndon Johnson said he would not seek re-election. 

It also comes amid concerted US efforts to broker a ceasefire in Gaza, with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu set for a high-stakes meeting with the US president on Tuesday.

During his term, Biden has approved billions of dollars in aid to Ukraine as well as Israel and Taiwan, hiked tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, and sought to push Israel and Hamas towards agreeing a ceasefire in the Gaza war. While Biden’s decision not to seek re-election makes him something of a “lame duck” domestically, it is unclear how the next six months will play out on the world stage.

FRANCE 24 spoke with Dr. Leslie Vinjamuri, the director of the US and the Americas Programme at Chatham House and a professor of international relations at the University of London. 

What can Biden do during the rest of his mandate to push for a US-brokered ceasefire in the war in Gaza? How can he pressure Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to work towards a ceasefire, both this week when Netanyahu is in Washington and beyond?

I think the leverage that President Biden has has been leverage that, so far, he hasn’t really been willing to use, which is to delay the delivery of weapons to Israel. There have been a few categories of weapons that he has held back on, but for the most part, that aid has continued to flow. The bear hug (with Netanyahu) with a hard line in private hasn’t been successful, and I think at this point taking a much more direct line would be a good idea. And also making it clear that there has to be some plan for the day after [the war ends]. That’s what’s really severely lacking. And a plan that has some vision of a solution to the Palestinian problem. A two-state solution is the position of President Biden, it’s certainly not the position of Prime Minister Netanyahu – but I think he’s got to much more forcefully drive that home. 

There’s been ongoing pressure and ongoing effort on the part of the administration and powers in the region to negotiate a ceasefire. Obviously, Israel wants to see that they’re going to get hostages back, and there are all sorts of complexities surrounding prisoner exchange. But I think that Biden would receive very positive endorsement and feedback and set his party up in a stronger place if he could express to Netanyahu that support for Israel is not the same as support for Israel’s war in Gaza when the loss of life is so extreme.

What can Joe Biden accomplish during the rest of his mandate to aid Ukraine?

Joe Biden is still operating in the context of a Congress that is not going to allow him to legislate for additional funds, so he’s got to work with what he has. I think the best thing he can do is to work very hard with the Europeans on mapping out a plan for how they can continue to sustain support for Ukraine. There have been some very interesting ideas put forward, one of them by Poland’s foreign minister (Radoslaw Sikorski), who has said that if money dries up from the US that Europe could buy weapons from the United States and use frozen Russian assets in Europe to pay for those. But the broader point here would be, can the president work with Europe and European nations collectively and individually to find common measures for securing supplies to Ukraine?

Related to that is beginning to think about some sort of negotiation [to end the fighting] in 2025 and … getting the US and Europe aligned on what that might look like and where they want Ukraine to be positioned before any negotiation would take place. What territory would they like [Ukraine] to have and hold on the ground? 

Also, working with Europe to really put firm pressure on China to stop supporting Russia’s war efforts. This is very difficult, but it’s clearly vital that Europe and the United States are aligned on this question of China, and President Biden has got a clear runway of six months to try and achieve that. That’s not going to be easy, but it’s essential. 

A lot of it will come down to bilateral and multilateral diplomacy with Europeans. Using evidence and data, demonstrating the risk and the threat that China presents in its support of Russia, working through what policies Europeans could agree with the US to put pressure on China, either when it comes to any kind of technological exchange with China, any inroads into Europe and, very specifically, having an aligned position.

It’s actually quite difficult to invest in the diplomacy that’s necessary to persuade Europe of the importance of this at a time when Europeans are under pressure on multiple fronts. But really getting that into position either before Kamala Harris becomes president, or – a much more worrying scenario, with respect to Ukraine and Europe – if Donald Trump were to become president. 

What can Biden do during the rest of his mandate to shape relations with China and neighbouring countries in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as Taiwan?

This is another one where a lot of what is going to be essential is doubling down on what [Biden’s] already done. He’s already made significant strides towards bringing Japan, South Korea and the US together. That, I think, is critical to deepen and secure the Quad (the Quadrilateral Security Alliance between the US, India, Japan and Australia) to the extent that he can help galvanise and clarify an agenda in the Quad. The question of North Korea is a profound one. Deterrence is critical, and I think that this is an area that needs a lot of attention. 

The president has been very successful at building up a number of coalitions in sort of a lattice framework for investing in partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific, not only bilaterally but in collective groupings. And that, I think, has been very important for America’s key partners and for the region as a whole. Having some internal stability in the face of a rising China, a China that’s frequently very assertive, even aggressive – to the extent that this can be deepened, I think it’s crucial. 

It’s a little bit of a stretch, given the short timeline, but what I would have liked to have seen is Biden making more of a move towards turning the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) into something that was meaningful. I think, unfortunately, he will finish his term having really failed to make inroads into any kind of serious economic engagement in the region, apart from a very tough set of policies that are about export controls and limiting exchange with China. The problem with IPEF is that it’s sort of an empty vessel. There are multiple negotiations that would need to take place across a range of dimensions. If they could even choose two and say, ‘We’re going to advance cooperation’ along a couple of dimensions and make some headway, that would be very positive – if [Biden] could at least signal the significance of America’s role as an economic power in the region, [which] requires making some sort of offer of market access to regional players, and that there was some positive agenda for his successor to take forward.

The other thing is to continue some sense that those weapons promised to Taiwan continue to be delivered. We’re behind on that. And that the focus on America’s commitment to Taiwan and that policy of strategic ambiguity is very clearly front and centre. We know that Donald Trump has had ambivalence about that; in fact, Joe Biden had ambivalence about that, in a slightly different direction. But I think that that is a very important area.